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Debiasing the Framing Effect in Younger and Older Adults’ Medical Decision Making 
Erin L. Woodhead 
 
 
The framing effect is a common decisional bias.  In the current study, the framing effect 
and its avoidance via a debiasing questionnaire was studied with younger and older adults 
making decisions regarding lung cancer treatment.  Participants received three cancer 
scenarios framed in either survival or mortality terms, with scenarios presented in 
cumulative probability, interval probability, and life expectancy format. There were two 
between-subjects factors and one within-subjects factor.  Younger adults exhibited the 
framing effect with the cumulative and interval probability formats. No framing effect 
was found in the debias condition.  Older adults exhibited the framing effect with the 
interval probability format.  Older adults in the debiasing condition showed the framing 
effect with the cumulative and interval probability formats.  Older adults who had 
received or provided care and those who knew someone with cancer were less likely to 
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Debiasing the Framing Effect in Younger and Older Adults’ 
Medical Decision Making 
 Each day, we make countless decisions, ranging from decisions to perform 
everyday tasks, to decisions regarding major life changes.  Although many of us would 
like to think that these decisions, whether small or large in scope, are based on rational 
consideration of the facts, many researchers (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; 
Fischhoff, 1975; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Miller & Fagley, 
1991) have demonstrated that this is frequently not the case. We tend to use heuristics, or 
mental shortcuts, which help us make relatively rapid decisions in situations where the 
information presented resembles that on which we have made previous decisions.  The 
major advantages of using heuristics are the reduced processing load and increased speed.  
Without the use of heuristics, we would spend the majority of our day thinking about 
decisions that are normally made automatically or with little information processing (e.g., 
Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977).  A major disadvantage of using heuristics is that it can lead 
us to consider a limited amount of the available information, resulting in a less informed, 
and potentially suboptimal, decision.   
  In a classic article on decision making, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) described 
three of the most common heuristics individuals use when making a decision: the 
representativeness heuristic, the availability heuristic, and the adjustment and anchoring 
heuristic.  Individuals often use the representativeness heuristic when they hear a 
description about a particular person (e.g., Ted likes to read, and would be described as 
quiet and reserved) and decide from this description that the person most likely fits into a 
particular category, such as “nerd.”  This decision is based on how representative the 
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description of the person is of the stereotypes we may hold about nerds, rather than how 
probable it is that this person is actually a nerd.  Tversky and Kahneman (1974) 
demonstrated the representativeness heuristic by giving participants brief personality 
descriptions of several individuals.  The participants were then asked to assess the 
probability that each of these individuals held a certain occupation, based on a list of 
occupations presented to participants.  A sample description was: “Steve is very shy and 
withdrawn, invariably helpful, but with little interest in people, or in the world of reality.  
A meek and tidy soul, he has a need for order and structure, and a passion for detail” 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, p.1124). Participants were most likely to choose librarian 
as the most probable occupation for Steve.  This judgment was based on how 
representative Steve was of the stereotype the participants held about librarians (e.g., 
reserved and quiet), instead of basing the decision on facts that could inform the decision 
(e.g., the number of libraries in the area). 
 The availability heuristic occurs when a decision is made based on the ease with 
which an individual can retrieve information from long-term memory.  For instance, one 
may make a decision about the prevalence of individuals with HIV/AIDS based on the 
number of individuals one has been exposed to with HIV/AIDS, without considering the 
actual prevalence of HIV/AIDS in the general population (i.e., base rate).  This heuristic 
is demonstrated with an example from Hastie and Dawes (2001).  When asked which is 
more common, murder or suicide, individuals often reply that murder is more common, 
even though statistics indicate that suicide is more common.  The answer of murder is 
presumably given because murders often get more publicity than suicides, and therefore 
this information is more “available” than information on suicides.   
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 An example of the third heuristic, adjustment and anchoring, is provided by 
Chapman and Johnson (2001).  Imagine you are trying to set a value for an antique piece 
of furniture you have just inherited.  You have recently seen a piece like yours priced 
rather steeply at a local antiques dealer, so you price your piece at about the same price as 
theirs.  However, if you had instead seen a similar piece at a yard sale for a much lower 
price, you would be more inclined to price your piece of furniture in accordance with that 
lower price.  As implied by the name of this heuristic, an individual first recalls an 
“anchor,” or a number he or she has in his or her head that may represent the appropriate 
number, and then adjusts that value up or down accordingly from this anchor.  In the 
example above, being presented first with either a low or high anchor influences the final 
price chosen for the piece of furniture. 
To test the adjustment and anchoring heuristic, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) 
asked participants to provide answers to various questions, and to state their answers in 
percentages.  For example, participants were asked to estimate the percentage of African 
countries in the United Nations. Prior to giving their answer, participants were given a 
random number, generated by spinning a wheel, between 1 and 100 (the anchor).  The 
participants were then asked to estimate the answer to the initial question.  For those 
participants initially given the number 10 as their anchor, the median answer to the 
original question was 25 percent.  For those participants initially given the number 65 as 
their anchor, the median answer to the original question was 45 percent.  This example 
illustrates that the presentation of a high or low anchor is related to the answer that is 
provided.    
 4
 In addition to the influence of heuristics, our choices can be biased by how we use 
the relevant information we have stored in memory.  Often the judgments we make are 
memory-based in the sense that the knowledge we often need is stored in long-term 
memory. We tend to recall information that is easiest to retrieve from long-term memory 
(Hastie & Dawes, 2001) in the process of making decisions. Therefore, our decision 
making can be biased when it is based on the selective retrieval of information that is 
easiest to retrieve.   
One of the common biases is the hindsight bias (Fischhoff, 1975).  This bias 
occurs when individuals overestimate their ability to predict the correct outcome of 
situations in advance for which the outcome has been provided to them (Chapman & 
Johnson, 2001).  For example, a coworker may say that she knew “all along” that a 
certain candidate would win the election.  However, if the same coworker was asked 
during the election which candidate she thought would win, she would not be as 
confident in the answer.  The hindsight bias is a common attempt to have our memories 
of events fit our current knowledge of events (Hastie & Dawes, 2001).  The memory that 
is more accessible is who actually won the election.  Trying to remember what our 
thought process was during the actual event requires more mental processing than 
assuming that what is correct now is what we thought all along.    
 Although recalling our easiest to remember memories may be an efficient use of 
time in the decision making process, it often leads to errors in judgment.  In an attempt to 
organize the literature on judgment errors, Arkes (1991) developed a classification 
system for errors of judgment according to the “cost” each bias represents to a person. 
For example, the use of some heuristics has a benefit of faster processing speed, but a 
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cost of reduced attention to details.  Arkes’ first category is strategy-based judgment 
errors.  This type of judgment error involves trading the “cost” of complex cognitive 
processing for the benefit of reduced processing time, thereby making the complex task at 
hand less taxing to the individual.  An example of a strategy-based judgment would 
involve increasing processing speed by overlooking necessary information in a complex 
problem solving task.  Overlooking necessary information may lead to an incorrect 
answer due to the reduced time spent attending to the relevant details of the problem. 
 Arkes’ second category is association-based judgment errors.  This type of 
judgment error results from filtering information so it fits a pre-existing cognitive 
structure, thereby reducing processing time.  The cost of this bias is that a certain 
hypothesis may be viewed as correct, simply because the information we need to evaluate 
the hypothesis is easy to retrieve from memory.  Examples of association-based judgment 
errors are the representativeness and availability heuristics, and the hindsight bias, 
discussed above.  All of these heuristics rely on pre-existing knowledge that individuals 
try to “fit” onto the current situation, even if it is incorrect for the current situation.  
To demonstrate association-based judgment errors, Arkes (1991) provided an 
example of an experiment conducted by Gilovich (1981) in which newspaper 
sportswriters rated the potential of various college players to become professional 
football players.  If a college player was said to come from the same hometown of a 
current professional football player, the college player was rated as having a much higher 
probability of becoming a professional football player than those college players who 
were not from the same hometown as a professional player.  The sportswriters relied only 
on the information regarding which schools had previously produced professional 
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football players, not on the actual data about the quality of the football program or the 
talent of the individual football player.  The sportswriters were relying on the availability 
heuristic by assuming that certain schools would have higher rates of producing 
professional football players, only because the data on where the professional football 
players had attended high school was currently available to them. 
Arkes’ third category is psychophysically based errors.  These errors result from 
the use of an unconscious reference point to which we orient when making a decision.  
Examples of psychophysically based errors include the anchoring and adjustment 
heuristic, the sunk cost effect, and the framing effect.  The sunk cost effect, originally 
described by Arkes and Blumer (1985), results from decision making based on how much 
money has been spent on a project in the past.  Arkes and Blumer provided an example of 
the sunk cost effect with the results of a field study about season ticket subscribers to a 
theatre series.  In this study, individuals who paid more money for a season ticket 
subscription attended more plays during the next 6 months than those who had paid less 
money for a season ticket subscription, in order to justify the money they had already 
spent.  The group who initially paid more felt like they had more of an investment in the 
tickets, rather than realizing that whether they attended the plays, the money had already 
been spent.  The sunk cost effect occurred in this study due to the greater tendency of the 
higher-paying group to continue with the theatre series once they made a monetary 
investment in it, due to a desire to not appear wasteful, even though the money had 




The Framing Effect 
 Another common error that occurs under conditions of uncertainty in decision 
making is the framing effect.  The framing effect occurs when an individual is presented 
with two differently worded (framed) versions of a problem that describe identical 
outcomes, yet results in a different decision for each version of the problem (Hastie & 
Dawes, 2001).   The classic study that demonstrated the framing effect used the "Asian 
Disease Problem" (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).  Two groups were presented with the 
same situation of the United States preparing for an outbreak of an unusual Asian disease 
that was expected to kill 600 people.  The participants had to choose between two 
alternative programs to combat the disease.  The first group of participants was presented 
with two programs that were worded in terms of gains, that is, lives saved.  One of the 
program options (Program A) was worded as a “sure-bet,” stating that if Program A was 
adopted, 200 people would be saved.  The other program option (Program B) was worded 
as a more risky option, stating that if Program B was adopted, there was a 1 in 3 
probability that 600 people would be saved and a 2 in 3 probability that no one would be 
saved. The participants were then asked to choose between these 2 program options.  
Participants were more likely to choose Program A, the “sure-bet,” or risk-averse option, 
even though in both options the outcome was the same (200 saved in Program A, and 
one-third of 600 saved in Program B).  
The second group of subjects was presented with two programs that were worded 
in terms of lives lost, presenting a “sure-bet” and a “risky” program option.  The sure-bet 
option (Program C) stated that if Program C was adopted, 400 people would die.  The 
risky option (Program D) stated that if Program D was adopted, there was a 1 in 3 
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probability that nobody would die, and a 2 in 3 probability that 600 would die.  For 
Program D, the 2 in 3 probability that 600 would die was equal to 400 dying if Program 
C was chosen.  The subjects were then asked to choose which program option they would 
implement. The majority of participants in the second group, which was presented with 
the programs in a “lives lost,” or mortality frame, chose the program that was risky 
(Program D), instead of the program that was a “sure-bet.”  The different program 
options presented to the two groups, although worded differently, had the same 
probability of occurring, yet the first group was risk-averse when presented with survival 
data, and the second group was risk-seeking when presented with mortality data.   
 The framing effect appears to occur equally with younger and older adults 
(Mayhorn, Fisk, & Whittle, 2002; Rönnlund, Karlsson, Laggnäs, Larsson, & Lindström, 
2005). Rönnlund et al. (2005) examined the effects of framing on risky decision making 
in younger (M = 23.8) and older adults (M = 69.1).  Both age groups were risk seeking 
after being presented with the negative frame, and risk averse when presented with the 
positive frame.  This recent research supports the findings of Tversky and Kahneman’s 
(1981) classic Asian disease scenario, and provides further evidence that the framing 
effect can be demonstrated across adult age groups.  
 In an effort to distinguish between different types of framing effects, Levin, 
Schneider, & Gaeth (1998) proposed a typology of framing effects: risky choice framing, 
attribute framing, and goal framing.  Risky choice framing was originally proposed by 
Tversky and Kahneman’s (1981) “Asian Disease Problem,” which is discussed above.  
The findings are generally consistent for studies examining risky choice framing. 
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Individuals are more likely to be risk seeking when the outcome is negatively framed 
(mortality rates) and risk averse when it is positively framed (survival rates). 
 The second type of framing outlined by Levin et al. (1998) is attribute framing.  
This occurs when the description of an object has either a negative or positive attribute 
associated with it.  An example of this type of framing is evident in Levin’s (1987) 
experiment in which subjects were asked to rate the desirability of ground beef based on 
whether the description of the beef emphasized the fat content or the lean meat content. 
Subjects were either told that the ground beef was 75% lean (positive frame) or 25% fat 
(negative frame).  Subjects who were asked to rate the desirability of the 75% lean beef 
rated it as leaner, less greasy, and of higher quality than those subjects who were asked to 
rate the desirability of the 25% fat beef.  Despite the fact that the total fat content was the 
same for the two descriptions, subjects presented with either of these two descriptions 
gave different ratings of the beef desirability.  This study illustrates how even the framing 
of relatively objective information, such as fat content, has an effect on decision making. 
 Goal framing involves describing a goal, such as quitting smoking, desirable 
consequences of achieving the goal, and persuasive reasons why achieving the goal is 
beneficial.  The emphasis of the presentation of information is either on the potential 
benefit of achieving the goal, or the potential of the goal to prevent a loss.  This type of 
framing is illustrated nicely with a study by Meyerowitz and Chaiken (1987).  The 
researchers presented participants with information regarding breast self-examination 
(BSE).  Half of the participants received information that highlighted the negative 
consequences of not performing breast self-examination (negative frame).  The other half 
of the participants received information on the benefits of performing breast self-
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examination (positive frame).  The results indicated that, compared with the positively 
framed information,  the negatively framed information (consequences of not doing the 
behavior) produced more favorable attitudes about performing BSE, greater estimates of 
number of times in the next year the participants actually intended to perform BSE, and a 
greater occurrence of actually performing BSE, as indicated in a 4-month follow-up 
interview. 
Prospect Theory 
 In 1979, Kahneman and Tversky proposed prospect theory, which describes why 
individuals may succumb to the framing effect.  Prospect theory stands out from other 
theories of economic utility because of the idea of a moveable reference point (Hastie & 
Dawes, 2001).  A moveable reference point means that for each decision making process, 
different standards are applied by the individual.  What constitutes a loss in one situation 
could differ from what constitutes a loss in another situation.  Another tenet of prospect 
theory is that losses hurt more than gains satisfy. Thus a gain of some monetary value is 
not equal to the loss of that same value.  This is termed loss aversion.  Finally, Kahneman 
and Tversky proposed that decision makers will be risk averse when deciding between 
gains, and risk seeking when deciding between losses.  Hastie and Dawes (2001) 
provided an example of decision making with prospect theory:  
Imagine you have just received $200.  Which of the following options would you 
prefer? 
Option 1: You receive an additional $100. 
Option 2: A fair coin is tossed.  If it lands heads, you receive an additional $200;   
 if it lands tails, you receive nothing more (p.216). 
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When presented with the above scenario, most individuals choose Option 1, 
demonstrating that they are risk averse when it comes to deciding between gains.  One 
would rather be sure he or she receives the additional money than take a risk with Option 
2. 
In an example representing risk seeking behavior, an individual is presented with 
this dilemma (Hastie & Dawes, 2001):  
Imagine you have just received $400, but there is a penalty attached.  You must 
choose one of the two penalty options: 
Penalty Option 1: You must give back $100. 
Penalty Option 2: A fair coin is tossed.  If it lands heads, you must give                                                
back $200; if it lands tails, you may keep all of the money (p. 216). 
When presented with this scenario, most respondents choose penalty option 2, 
demonstrating that when presented with possible losses, most respondents are risk 
seeking.   
 The framing effect works in a similar way as the examples outlined above.  
Subjects are presented with two scenarios with equal outcomes, though the outcomes are 
worded differently.  Based on which wording the subject receives, different decisions are 
made.  An area where the framing effect has been consistently demonstrated is that of 
medical decision making. 
The Framing Effect and Medical Decision Making 
 Studies on framing in medical decision making indicate that patients may be 
influenced by the frame of the medical information presented for a decision, and may not 
be making entirely bias-free medical decisions (Hastie & Dawes, 2001).  In today’s 
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medical world, doctors are expected to present patients with a variety of options for 
treatment, along with information regarding prognosis and likelihood of desired and 
undesired results for each treatment.  In the past, patients were typically not given a 
choice, and may not have even been informed why they were supposed to take a certain 
medication (Hastie & Dawes, 2001).  One may assume that being presented with 
treatment options would provide the basis for a bias-free decision, due to the doctor 
explaining the benefits and drawbacks of each treatment.  However, several studies have 
shown that the way the medical information is presented can affect the final decision 
made by the patient. 
 How the physician describes the probability of different treatment outcomes can 
affect the patient’s decision, even when different choices yield the same probability of a 
particular outcome (e.g., death or survival).  For instance, wording the treatment outcome 
in terms of survival rates or in terms of mortality rates can affect which treatment the 
patient chooses (e.g., Moxey, O’Connell, McGettigan, & Henry, 2003; Armstrong, 
Schwartz, Fitzgerald, Putt, & Ubel, 2002; McKee, 2001; Tengs, 1987).  In a classic 
demonstration of the effect of survival versus mortality wording, McNeil, Pauker, Sox, 
and Tversky (1982) presented physicians, patients, and graduate students with two 
medical procedures, radiation therapy and surgery, and asked them to choose between the 
two treatments for a hypothetical lung cancer patient.  The two potential outcomes of the 
treatments (number living or dying within certain intervals of receiving the treatment) 
were presented either in survival or mortality wording.  In both the survival and mortality 
worded scenarios, surgery was presented as having a more immediate risk than radiation.  
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 For example, in the survival wording, the surgery option stated that out of 100 
people, 90 would live through the postoperative period, whereas the radiation option 
stated that out of 100 people, all would live through treatment.  For the mortality 
wording, the survival option stated that out of 100 people, 10 would die during surgery or 
in the postoperative period, whereas the radiation option stated that out of 100 people, 
none would die during treatment.  In the first scenario, worded in terms of survival rates, 
only 25% of respondents chose radiation.  In the second scenario, worded in terms of 
mortality rates, 42% of the respondents chose radiation.  This indicates that participants 
were more likely to choose surgery, the high-risk option with higher long-term survival 
rates, when information was presented in terms of survival, and choose radiation, the 
low-risk option with higher short-term survival rates, when information was presented in 
terms of mortality. 
 McNeil et al. (1982) also examined treatment preference under two different 
outcome information types: life expectancy and cumulative probability.  They found that, 
across participants, surgery was chosen most often when outcome information was 
presented in terms of life expectancy. 
 Tengs (1987) performed a study similar to McNeil et al. (1982) in which 
undergraduate students were presented with six treatment scenarios.  Three of the 
potential outcomes of the treatments were worded in terms of survival rates (90% of 
people would live until the end of treatment), while the other three potential outcomes 
were worded in terms of mortality rates (10% of people would die by the end of 
treatment).  In both the mortality frame and survival frame, one scenario was worded in 
terms of cumulative probability (e.g., 10 will die in treatment, 32 will have died by 1 
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year), one scenario was worded in terms of interval probability (e.g., 22 people will die in 
the interval between treatment and one year), and one scenario was worded in terms of 
overall life expectancy (e.g., the number of people who live 1 to 5 years after treatment).  
Tengs found that subjects more often chose surgery (the high-risk option) in the survival 
frame and radiation (the low-risk option) in the mortality frame, when data were 
presented in the cumulative probability format. The subjects chose surgery least often 
when data were presented in the life expectancy format.  Therefore, both the outcome 
information type (cumulative probability, interval probability, or life-expectancy) and the 
frame (survival or mortality) had an impact on the medical treatment chosen. 
 McKee (2001) replicated and extended the work of Tengs (1987) to demonstrate 
the framing effect in medical decision making among both younger and older adults. 
Young college students and older adults were presented with the same six medical 
scenarios as used in Tengs’ (1987) study.  However, in McKee’s (2001) study, each 
subject was presented with both the survival and mortality wording, in a within-subjects 
design.  McKee (2001) also investigated the effects of a physician recommendation on 
the framing effect, since physicians are often looked to as experts and are expected to 
recommend what they consider to be the best course of action for their patients.  The 
results of the study found that across age groups and outcome information types, surgery 
(the high-risk option) was chosen more frequently than radiation (the low-risk option) in 
the survival frame, and radiation was chosen more frequently than surgery in the 
mortality frame.  This finding is consistent with the results of McNeil, Pauker, Sox, and 
Tversky (1982).  Additionally, McKee (2001) found a framing effect for survival versus 
mortality wording when outcome data were presented in the life expectancy format.  In 
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these data formats, both older and younger adults chose surgery significantly more often 
than radiation. The physician recommendation did not eliminate the framing effect.   
 The results of these studies indicate that patients may not be making bias-free 
decisions when presented with a few options for treatment, given that respondents make 
different decisions when the information is presented in various frames and outcome 
information types. Patients may potentially choose a more risky option when the 
information is presented in terms of survival rates.  Additionally, how the outcome 
information is presented (cumulative probability, interval probability, or life-expectancy) 
has an effect on the final decision made by a patient.   
 In light of the many studies showing support for a framing effect in medical 
decision making, one may wonder whether it is possible for a patient to make an 
informed decision regarding which medical treatment is objectively the best one for him 
or her.  All of the studies discussed above reveal that patients make different treatment 
decisions depending on how the treatment is framed.  This could lead a patient to choose 
a treatment based only on wording, with no information on which treatment is objectively 
better.  One option that gives control to the patient is to inform patients of the framing 
effect and attempt to teach them a strategy that avoids the framing effect, that is, a 
debiasing strategy.   
Debiasing 
 A small amount of literature has been devoted to the task of debiasing individuals 
against the various biases that lead to errors in judgment.  However, as Turk and Salovey 
(1986) noted, most of the literature on judgment biases has identified various forms of 
bias (e.g., Thorburn, Harvey, & Ryan, 2005; Reimer, Mata, & Stoecklin, 2004),  
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but has not addressed how to avoid the bias.  One might think that simply by describing a 
bias to an individual, the individual will become aware of the bias, and therefore not 
exhibit the bias when making a judgment.  However, as Arkes (1981) pointed out, this 
approach has not proven effective.  Fischhoff (1977) demonstrated the ineffectiveness of 
this approach by presenting two groups of subjects with a series of difficult two-choice 
questions, where the correct answer was already circled for them.  The subjects were 
asked to answer the questions as if they had been given them without the correct answer 
circled.  Having the correct answers already circled may lead the subjects to commit the 
hindsight bias, which would lead them to overestimate their ability to predict the correct 
answer when it has already been provided for them.  One of the groups was provided 
with a description of the hindsight bias and how this bias could affect their response to 
the questions.  The second group was not informed of their potential to commit the 
hindsight bias.  The first group was asked to try and not commit the same error of 
judgment that participants in the second group would commit by knowing about the 
hindsight bias.  The attempt at debiasing was unsuccessful, as both groups exhibited the 
hindsight bias. 
 One debiasing technique that has been shown to work across a wide range of 
scenarios involves asking participants to provide a rationale for their answers.  In a 
demonstration of this debiasing technique, Arkes, Faust, Guilmette, and Hart (1988) were 
able to successfully eliminate the hindsight bias by asking participants to state one reason 
supporting the final choice they made.  In this study, three groups of neuropsychologists 
were presented with three possible diagnoses for a short case history.  One group of 
subjects was told which of the three diagnoses was the correct one, while a second group 
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was not told which diagnosis was the correct one. The participants were then asked to 
assign a probability to each of the three choices that they would have given each of the 
diagnoses based on the symptoms, before being told the correct diagnosis.  The group 
that was told of the correct diagnosis showed a hindsight bias towards that diagnosis, 
assigning a larger percentage to the correct diagnosis.  A third group of subjects, who 
were also given the correct diagnosis from the start of the study, were successfully 
debiased against the hindsight bias by stating one reason supporting each of their three 
diagnoses, before assigning probabilities.   
The framing effect has received less attention than other judgment biases with 
regard to debiasing. Only a few studies to date (Miller & Fagley, 1991; Sieck & Yates, 
1997; Bernstein, Chapman, & Elstein, 1999; Mashat, 2004) have attempted to neutralize 
the framing effect through debiasing.  One of these studies (Miller & Fagley, 1991) 
successfully debiased individuals against the framing effect by requesting a rationale for 
their choices, as was done by Arkes et al. (1988) with the hindsight bias.  The participants 
were presented with six scenarios similar to the scenarios used in Tversky and 
Kahneman’s (1981) Asian disease scenario.  Half of the participants were asked to make 
a choice between intervention programs after reading the scenarios.  The other half were 
asked to provide a rationale before making their final choice. In spite of the equivalence 
of the two intervention programs, the participants who did not provide a rationale chose 
the more risky program when the scenarios were framed negatively rather than positively, 
thus demonstrating the framing effect. The participants who were asked to provide a 
rationale chose program options with similar frequency when presented with the positive 
and negative frames.  By having to justify the decision they were making, the debiased 
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group of subjects became aware of the equivalence of the two programs and the framing 
effect was eliminated. 
Sieck and Yates (1997) used a similar procedure to preclude the framing effect in 
college-aged students presented with the Asian disease scenario and a scholarship 
problem scenario.  Participants were placed in either a control, anticipated exposition, or 
exposition group.  Participants in the exposition group were asked to write why they 
thought their choice was the “smart thing to do” before making their choices.  
Participants in the anticipated exposition group were told that they would be asked to 
write about their choice after they had made it.  The control group participants were not 
instructed to write about their decisions.  For the Asian disease scenario, the framing 
effect was not present in the exposition group, but was present in the anticipated 
exposition and control group.  For the scholarship problem scenario, which was chosen 
because it is not as strict a representation of the framing effect as is the Asian disease 
scenario, none of the conditions successfully eliminated the framing effect.  Although the 
results of this study are confusing in light of the different results for the Asian disease and 
scholarship problem scenarios, the mechanism of debiasing is similar to Miller and 
Fagley’s (1991) rationale request technique. 
 Bernstein, Chapman, and Elstein (1999) attempted to debias participants against 
the effect of framing in a clinical context.  Participants were asked to imagine that they 
had a chronic disease that would result in them living for about two years if the disease 
went untreated.  They were then told of a drug that allowed patients to live for about 20 
years with the disease.  However, for this drug to work, it had to be paired with one of 
two supplementary drugs that induced life-shortening diseases.  Participants were then 
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asked to choose one of the supplementary drugs.  One group of participants received 
segregated editing, in which the outcomes of the supplementary drug were presented 
alone, forcing the participants to determine the additive effects of the original and 
supplementary drugs.  A second group received integrated wording, in which the original 
drug effects were combined with the supplementary drug effects to produce a final 
estimate of longevity.  A framing effect was found between these equal, but differently 
worded, scenarios.  A third group of participants received both the segregated editing and 
the integrated editing formats, in a within-subjects design.  Results showed that 
presenting both alternative editings prior to asking the participant for his or her choice 
helped to reduce the effect of frame.   
 In a more recent study, Mashat (2004) attempted to debias college-aged students 
against the framing effect.  Using the same six medical decision scenarios used by Tengs 
(1987) and McKee (2001), participants were either presented with survival or mortality 
worded scenarios, with one scenario presented in cumulative probability format, one in 
interval probability format, and one in overall life-expectancy format.  Before making 
their choices, half of the participants received a debiasing questionnaire asking them to 
consider the advantages and disadvantages of surgery vs. radiation. The other participants 
(control group) received a questionnaire containing general information related to cancer.  
This questionnaire was provided as a control for time and effort, and the participants 
were not asked to do anything with this information.  
When the data were presented in cumulative probability format, participants more 
often chose surgery in the survival worded scenario and radiation in the mortality worded 
scenario.  Therefore, a framing effect was found for the cumulative probability format, as 
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indicated by the discrepancy in treatment choice based on survival or mortality wording.  
A framing effect was not found for the scenarios that were worded in interval probability 
format or overall life expectancy format.  Because a framing effect was shown only for 
the scenario worded in terms of cumulative probability, this scenario was the only one 
tested for successful debiasing.  For the cumulative probability data format, those 
participants who received the debiasing questionnaire did not show a framing effect for 
survival versus mortality wording. That is, there was no significant difference in the 
proportion of participants who chose surgery or radiation in the survival worded or 
mortality worded scenarios. 
 The results of these debiasing studies indicate that the use of heuristics and 
automatic processing, which lightens the cognitive load and shortens the mental 
processing time, often leads to errors in judgment, which can be circumvented by directly 
asking individuals to provide reasons for their choices.  By using the “rationale 
requested” technique, the framing effect was eliminated in the debiasing studies.  This 
allowed the participants to make medical decisions without the biases associated with the 
framing of medical information. 
Statement of the Problem 
 The population of older adults is steadily increasing.  In 2002, those over the age 
of 65 comprised over 12% of the U.S. population.  This number is expected to increase as 
the "Baby Boom" cohort begins to age.  By the year 2030 the percentage of the U.S. 
population over the age of 65 is projected to jump 20% (U.S. Administration on Aging, 
2003).  Although approximately 38% of non-institutionalized older adults report their 
health as being “excellent” or “very good” (U.S. Administration on Aging, 2003), 85% of 
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older adults over the age of 60 have at least one chronic disease (Cassel, Rudberg, & 
Olshansky, 1992).  As one ages, the increased risk of disease leads to the increased 
demand to make important medical decisions.  Older age also increases the likelihood 
that an individual will face long term care, where decisions are often made regarding 
medical advance directives. Therefore, older adults are potentially making more medical 
decisions than any other age group. Additionally, older adults are more likely to face 
medical decisions that have potentially life-threatening consequences.   
 Taking into consideration the results of the debiasing studies presented, it may be 
possible to eliminate decisional biases that are operative (e.g., framing effect, 
representativeness heuristic). Because the framing effect results from the method by 
which information is presented (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; McKee, 2001; 
Rönnlund et al., 2005), there is an opportunity for an intervention that could yield better 
informed and less biased medical decisions.  
 As discussed earlier, Mashat (2004) used a questionnaire that required young 
adult participants to consider the potential advantages and disadvantages of a 
hypothetical medical treatment, to preclude the effect of framing.  Similarly, Miller and 
Fagley (1991) requested a rationale from participants before making a choice, whereas 
Sieck and Yates (1997) asked the participant to write about their choice before making it.  
These techniques that required careful consideration of alternatives successfully 
eliminated the framing effect.  Bernstein, Chapman, and Elstein (1999) presented each 
participant with two frames, instead of one, to reduce the framing effect.  They 
hypothesized that seeing two different frames of the decision would allow the participant 
to compare the discrepant information and therefore eliminate the framing effect.  
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Although Bernstein, Chapman, and Elstein (1999) reported that the framing effect was 
reduced when participants received two frames, McKee (2001) found that the framing 
effect was produced with certain outcome information types when participants were 
presented with two frames.  Additionally, Mashat (2004) was only able to produce a 
framing effect when data were presented in the cumulative probability format, while 
McKee (2001) found an effect of frame for both younger and older adults when the data 
were presented in life expectancy format. 
In light of the many healthcare decisions faced by older adults, and the potential 
gravity of their consequences, finding successful ways to avoid the framing effect in 
medical decision making is especially important for this population.  Though Mashat 
(2004), Bernstein, Chapman, and, Elstein (1999), and Miller & Fagley (1991) 
demonstrated debiasing with young adults, no published research has attempted to 
preclude the framing effect through a debiasing procedure with older adults.  All of the 
debiasing studies to date have been performed with college-aged younger adults.  
Because of this, nothing is known about whether other age groups would respond 
similarly to a debiasing procedure.  There are a variety of ways that younger adults may 
differ from older adults in medical decision making.  Younger adults tend to be a 
relatively healthy population, so medical decision making scenarios, often involving life-
threatening disorders, may not be as salient to them as they would be to older individuals 
who are more likely to face medical decisions.  Because of the relative healthiness of 
younger adults, they may not have as much experience with making medical decisions as 
an older population.  In addition, older adults may be more equipped to evaluate different 
pieces of information upon which a medical decision is to be made.  For example, older 
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adults have probably accumulated more information about medical disorders due to the 
accumulated number of medial problems over their lifespan and the fact that most have at 
least one chronic illness.  Additionally, older adults potentially have more exposure to, 
and discussions with, friends and relatives that have illnesses.   
Yates and Patalano (1999) present a model of analytic, rule-based, and automatic 
processing which states that individuals presented with a decision for the first time are 
more likely to approach it analytically, whereas individuals who have seen situations 
repeatedly may invoke rule-based or automatic approaches to decision making.  In 
medical decision making, older adults may be the more experienced decision makers, and 
therefore may approach decision making from a rule-based, or automatic approach, 
which would make them more likely to use heuristics.  It is unclear, however, whether 
these age-related differences influence susceptibility to the framing effect or the outcome 
of attempts to preclude the effect. 
 Younger and older adults may also differ with regard to some of the cognitive 
abilities used for decision making (e.g., working memory, reasoning; Craik, 2000), which 
could contribute to age-related differences in the decision making process. For example, 
medical decision making often demands considerable working memory and processing 
resources. Compared to younger adults, older adults often show poorer performance on 
working memory tasks (Park et al., 1996), comprehension tasks (Dixon, Hultsch, Simon, 
& von Eye, 1984), and processing speed tasks (Salthouse, 1993).  In light of these 
declines in cognitive functioning, some have argued that older adults may rely more on 
heuristics during decision making to reduce the cognitive demands of the task (e.g., Park, 
1999).  Consequently, older adults may be more susceptible to the framing effect because 
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they are less inclined to consider and process all medical information presented to them.  
On the other hand, one might expect older adults to be less susceptible to the framing 
effect because they are more likely to have the relevant knowledge necessary to make 
unbiased medical decisions.  
Currently, none of the research on the framing effect has attempted to determine 
who is more likely to succumb to the effect of framing or to the debiasing procedure.  In 
Mashat’s (2004) study, not all participants succumbed to the effect of framing, and not all 
participants were able to be debiased.  One component of the decision making process 
that may relate to susceptibility to framing and debiasing is how complete an individual’s 
rationale is for choosing one treatment over another.  Meyer, Russo, and Talbot (1995) 
found that older women offered less complete rationales for their decisions regarding 
breast cancer treatment options, indicating that a participants’ rationale may play a part in 
the decision making process. 
Present Study 
 The present study replicated and extended Mashat (2004) and McKee (2001) by 
testing the following hypotheses: 1a) the proportion of younger adults in the control 
group selecting surgery in the survival frame will differ significantly from the proportion 
selecting surgery in the mortality frame in at least one outcome information type, 
indicating an effect of frame, 1b) the proportion of older adults in the control group 
selecting surgery in the survival frame will differ significantly from the proportion 
selecting surgery in the mortality frame in at least one outcome information type, 
indicating an effect of frame, 2a) the proportion of younger adult participants in the 
debiasing group selecting surgery in the survival frame will not differ from the proportion 
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selecting surgery in the mortality frame, indicating a successful debiasing procedure, and 
2b) the proportion of older adult participants in the debiasing group selecting surgery in 
the survival frame will not differ from the proportion selecting surgery in the mortality 
frame, indicating a successful debiasing procedure.  
A number of research questions were examined since the previous literature 
examining these topics was mixed.  The first research question asked: is the proportion of 
older adults who succumbed to the effect of framing, as indicated by a choice reversal 
across 2 or more scenarios, different than the proportion of younger adults who 
succumbed to the effect of frame?  The second question asked whether sex and age 
interacted as predictors of the framing effect. The third question asked whether the 




 Two groups, younger and older adults, were recruited for participation in the 
current study.  The first group consisted of 63 younger adults (38 women and 23 men) 
recruited from Introduction to Psychology classes, who had a mean age of 18.6 years 
(range 18-30; SD = 1.9).  Their mean education level was 13.3 years (range 11-17; SD = 
1.0).  The majority of the younger adult participants (55.6%) had been examined by a 
physician in the last 2 to 6 months.  A large percentage of the younger adults were 
Caucasian (79.4%), single (95.2%), and reported their health status as “Good” (52.4%), 
with only 3.2% reporting that they had been diagnosed with a chronic illness.  A 
moderate percentage of younger adults reported that they currently smoked (15.9%).  In 
terms of experience with cancer, 74.6% of the younger adults reported that they knew 
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someone who had been diagnosed with cancer.  The majority of this group knew 
someone who had been diagnosed with a cancer other than lung cancer (52.4%). For 
63.5% of those who knew someone with cancer, the person was in their extended family.  
Approximately half of the younger adult participants had discussed the treatment of 
cancer with someone who went through it (49.2%).   
 The second group of participants consisted of 61 older adults (41 women and 17 
men), recruited from senior centers and assisted living facilities, who had a mean age of 
76.8 years (range 65-98, SD = 7.1).  Their average level of education was 12.7 years 
(range 8-21, SD = 2.9).  The majority of older adult participants (52.5%) had been 
examined by a physician within 2 months of their participation in the study.  Most of the 
older adult participants were Caucasian (95.1%), widowed (57.4%), and reported their 
health status as either “Good” (39.3%) or “Average” (29.5%), with 65.6% reporting that 
they had been diagnosed with a chronic illness, and 4.9% reporting that they currently 
smoked.  A large percentage of the older adults (82.0%) reported that they knew someone 
who had been diagnosed with cancer.  For the majority of these participants (65.6%) the 
individual with cancer was in their immediate family, with 19.7% reporting that this 
individual had been diagnosed with lung cancer.  Among the older adult participants, 
60.7% had received or provided care at some point in their lives.  The majority of these 
participants were the care provider (54.1%), and had been the provider for anywhere 
between less than 6 months (18.0%) for more than ten years (3.3%).  Many of the older 
adults (59.0%) reported never discussing the treatment of cancer with an individual going 




 A 2 (age) x 2 (frame) x 3 (data format) design was employed, with repeated 
measures over the data format variable.  All participants received three medical 
scenarios: one in the cumulative probability data format, one in the interval probability 
data format, and one in the life expectancy data format.  Half of the participants received 
the three medical scenarios in survival wording, and half received the three medical 
scenarios in mortality wording.   
Materials 
 Demographic.  The demographic questionnaire (Appendix A) used in the current 
study was similar to the demographic questionnaire used by McKee (2001) and Mashat 
(2004).  The questionnaire asked the participant to complete basic information such as 
age, sex, years of education, marital status, and ethnicity.  The demographic 
questionnaire also included questions on the vicarious experience of cancer. 
Participant Instructions. The participant instructions (Appendix B) provided the 
participant with background information on the two treatment choices, surgery and 
radiation.  It also provided information on how well patients had recovered 6 weeks after 
receiving either treatment.  It then asked the participant to answer the questions in the 
order they appeared and to not revisit questions once they had provided an answer. 
Medical Scenarios.  A set of three medical scenarios (Appendices C & D) 
containing information about treatments for lung cancer, taken from Tengs (1987), 
McKee (2001), and Mashat (2004) served as the stimulus materials.  The three scenarios 
were framed in either survival or mortality wording.  The scenarios presented information 
on two alternative treatments for lung cancer: radiation treatment or surgery.  The 
 28
information about the treatments in the three scenarios was presented in cumulative 
probability, interval probability, and overall life-expectancy format.  Therefore, there 
were 6 possible scenarios: survival wording, cumulative probability format; survival 
wording, interval probability format; survival wording, life-expectancy format; mortality 
wording, cumulative probability format; mortality wording, interval probability format; 
and, mortality wording, life-expectancy format.   
 Control or Debiasing Questionnaires.  Participants were presented with either a 
debiasing (Appendix E) or control questionnaire (Appendix F).  The debiasing 
questionnaire included 5 questions, which required that the participant list the advantages 
and disadvantages of each treatment, and the information that was the most relevant in 
making his or her treatment choice.  The questions remained the same after the 
presentation of each scenario.  This debiasing technique of requesting a rationale was 
similar to the technique used by Miller & Fagley (1991) and Mashat (2004), to preclude 
the framing effect.  There were 3 different versions of the control questionnaire.  These 
questionnaires provided short commentaries on stress, dental hygiene, and physical 
fitness, and then asked the participant what changes he or she would be willing to make 
in his or her life if he or she was suffering from problems related to stress, gum disease, 
or lack of physical fitness.  These questionnaires were chosen to provide a control for the 
time and cognitive effort that the debiasing group of participants invested in their 
questionnaire.  These questionnaires contained no information related to any of the 
medical scenarios that could potentially affect the control group’s treatment choice.   
Treatment Choice Questionnaire. This form (Appendix G) asked the participants 
to circle whether they chose surgery or radiation for the scenario they just read.  
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Rationale Request.  After completing the treatment questionnaires, the control 
group participants were asked to record their treatment choice for all 3 scenarios on an 
answer sheet (Appendix H).  These participants were then asked to fill in a form 
requesting that they detail which pieces of information were most important in making 
their treatment decision in the three scenarios (Appendix I).   
Procedure 
 As participants volunteered to participate, they were sequentially assigned to one 
of four groups: survival worded scenarios with the control questionnaire, survival worded 
scenarios with the debiasing questionnaire, mortality worded scenarios with the control 
questionnaire, or mortality worded scenarios with the debiasing questionnaire.  All 
participants were presented with 3 scenarios: 1 scenario for each outcome information 
type (cumulative probability, interval probability, and life-expectancy).  After completing 
the written consent form and completing the demographic questionnaire, the participants 
read the participant instructions, and then read the first scenario.  After reading the first 
scenario, the participants completed either the debiasing or control questionnaire, and 
circled their treatment choice (surgery or radiation; Appendix H).  This process was 
repeated for the remaining 2 scenarios.  The cumulative probabilities format was 
presented first, followed by the interval probabilities format and the overall life 
expectancy format. 
Those participants who received the debiasing questionnaire were presented with 
the same questions after each vignette, while those who were presented with the control 
questionnaire received the stress questionnaire first, followed by the gum disease and 
physical fitness questionnaires.  The debiasing group was finished with the study after 
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completing the decision scenarios and making their treatment choices.  Members of the 
control group were asked to raise their hands when they had finished completing their 
medical decision scenarios.  A research assistant then removed the scenarios and used the 
answer sheet to circle the treatment choices the participant made.  The participants then 
received the answer sheet with their treatment choices circled.  At this point, the control 
group participants were asked to provide a rationale for the treatment choice they made 
on each of the 3 scenarios. 
The participants were presented with the following materials in the following 
order: (a) cover letter (Appendix J), (b) written consent form (Appendix K), (c) 
demographic questionnaire, (d) participant instructions containing information about 
radiation and surgery, (e) three scenarios, framed in either survival or mortality data, (f) 
debiasing or control questionnaire, and (e) answer sheet and rationale request form for 
those participants in the control group.  Data was collected in a group format, with 
approximately 5-10 participants per group administration.  Upon completion of the study, 
younger adult participants were awarded extra credit for their participation.  Older adult 
participants entered their names into a drawing for an opportunity to win $100. 
Results 
Initial Analyses 
 Before beginning analyses, the control and debias groups were compared on 
demographic variables, to ensure that the groups were not significantly different on 
relevant variables. The average years of education for the control group (M = 13.04) did 
not differ significantly from that of the debias group (M = 13.01; t(112) = .07, p = .95).  
Additionally, the self-rated health status did not differ between the control (M = 3.75) and 
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the debias groups (M = 3.84; t(120) = .50, p = .62).  The control group was 64.4% female, 
whereas the debias group was 68.3% female.  Within each group approximately equal 
percentages of participants reported being diagnosed with a chronic illness (35.5% 
control, 32.3% debias), whereas slightly more control group participants reported 
providing care at some point in their lives (43.5% control, 35.5% debias).   
Hypothesis Testing 
 Hypothesis 1a was that the younger adult control group would show a framing 
effect in at least one of the three medical scenarios.  This hypothesis was supported.  The 
percentages for each treatment choice by format for the younger adult control group are 
presented in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Choice Percentages and Significance for Younger Adult Control Group 
 Cumulative Probability* 
(n = 32) 
Interval Probability* 
(n = 32) 
Life Expectancy 
(n = 32) 
Frame Surgery     Radiation Surgery     Radiation Surgery     Radiation 
Survival    68.8             31.3    81.3              18.8   62.5              37.5 
Mortality   31.3             68.8   43.8              56.3   56.3              43.8 
* p < .05; Fisher’s exact test 
 In order to show the framing effect, significantly more participants than expected 
would have to choose surgery in the survival frame and radiation in the mortality frame.  
Therefore, a significant one-sided Fisher’s exact test (FET) would indicate an effect of 
frame.  For the cumulative probability format, the younger adult control group showed 
the framing effect (p < .05; FET).  A measure of the strength of association indicated that 
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approximately 14% of the variance in treatment choice for this format could be explained 
by frame (phi = .375, p < .05). 
 For the interval probability format, the younger adult control group also showed a 
framing effect (p < .05; FET) with approximately 15% of the variance in treatment choice 
explained by frame (phi = .387, p < .05).  Finally, for the overall life expectancy format, 
the younger adult control group did not show a framing effect (p = .500; FET).   
Hypothesis 1b was that the older adult control group would show a framing effect 
in at least one of the data formats.  As stated above, a significant Fisher’s exact test 
would indicate an effect of frame, due to the observed counts in the specified cells 
differing significantly from the expected counts.  The second hypothesis was also 
supported.  Treatment choice percentages by data format for the older adult control group 
are presented in Table 2.   
Table 2 
Choice Percentages and Significance for Older Adult Control Group 
 Cumulative Probability 
(n = 28) 
Interval Probability* 
(n = 28) 
Life Expectancy 
(n = 29) 
Frame Surgery     Radiation Surgery     Radiation Surgery     Radiation 
Survival      53.3            46.7   71.4              28.6    73.3             26.7 
Mortality     53.8            46.2   28.6              71.4    50.0             50.0 
* p < .05; Fisher’s exact test 
Whereas the younger adult control group showed the framing effect in 2 of the 3 
scenarios (cumulative probability and interval probability), the older adult control group 
showed the framing effect in only one scenario (interval probability, p < .05; FET).  For 
this data format, approximately 18% of the variance in treatment choice was explained by 
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frame (phi = .429, p < .05; FET).  The cumulative probability format and the overall life 
expectancy format did not show a framing effect for the older adult control group (p = 
.638, .181, respectively; FET).  
 Hypothesis 2a was that the younger adult group would avoid the framing effect 
through the use of a debiasing questionnaire.  To show a successful avoidance of the 
framing effect, the proportion of participants choosing surgery in the survival frame and 
the proportion choosing radiation in the mortality frame would not differ significantly 
from the expected counts.  Therefore, a non-significant one-sided Fisher’s exact test 
would indicate a successful debiasing attempt.  Treatment choice percentages are 
presented in Table 3. 
Table 3 
Choice Percentages and Significance for Younger Adult Debias Group 
 Cumulative Probability 
(n = 31) 
Interval Probability 
(n = 31) 
Life Expectancy 
(n = 31) 
Frame Surgery     Radiation Surgery     Radiation Surgery     Radiation 
Survival      53.3            46.7    66.7             33.3    80.0            20.0 
Mortality     31.3            68.8    50.0             50.0    62.5            37.5 
 
 For the cumulative probability format, the younger adult control group did show a 
framing effect and this effect was not present in the debiasing group (p = .189; FET).  For 
the interval probability format, the younger adult control group also showed a framing 
effect and this effect was not shown in the debiasing group (p = .283; FET).  For the life 
expectancy format, the younger adult control group did not show a framing effect, and 
there was also no framing effect demonstrated in the debiasing group (p = .250; FET).   
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 Hypothesis 2b was that the older adult group would avoid the framing effect 
through the use of a debiasing questionnaire.  Treatment choice percentages by data 
format are presented in Table 4.  
Table 4 
Contingency Tables and Significance for Older Adult Debias Group 
 Cumulative Probability* 
(n = 29) 
Interval Probability* 
(n = 27) 
Life Expectancy 
(n = 27) 
Frame Surgery     Radiation Surgery     Radiation Surgery     Radiation 
Survival     71.4            28.6    78.6            21.4   78.6             21.4 
Mortality    26.7            73.3    38.5            61.5   61.5             38.5 
* p < .05; Fisher’s exact test 
 For the cumulative probability format, the older adult control group did not show 
a framing effect, but a framing effect was present in the debiasing group for this format 
(p < .05; FET).  For the interval probability format, the older adult control group did 
show a framing effect, and it was not eliminated in the debiasing group (p < .05; FET).  
For the life expectancy format, the older adult control group did not show a framing 
effect, and the framing effect was also not present in the debiasing group (p = .293).  The 
raw data for the hypotheses 1a to 2b are presented in Appendix L.   
Research Questions 
 Three research questions were examined since the literature in these areas was not 
conclusive enough to propose a directional hypothesis.  The first research question asked 
which age group was most likely to succumb to the framing effect.  The results are 




Percentages for Succumbing to the Framing Effect by Age Group  
Age Group (N = 117) Did Succumb Did Not Succumb 
Younger Adults 45.2 54.8 
Older Adults 29.1 70.9 
Note. χ2 (1, N = 117) = 3.21, p = .07 
 To test this research question, participants were coded as either showing the 
framing effect or not by determining whether the participant had a choice reversal at any 
point throughout the 3 scenarios.  If all of a participant’s treatment choices were the same 
across scenarios, he or she was coded as not showing the framing effect.  If there was a 
choice reversal, he or she was coded as showing the framing effect.  Therefore, a 2x2 chi-
square was used to test this question (age x succumbing to the framing effect).  The chi-
square test was non-significant, χ2 (1, N = 117) = 3.21, p = .07.  An examination of the 
contingency table revealed that approximately 45% of younger adults succumbed to the 
framing effect, whereas approximately 29% of older adults succumbed.  The raw data for 
this analysis are presented in Appendix L. 
 The second research question asked whether age, sex, or the interaction of age 
and sex predicted which group of participants was most likely to succumb to the framing 
effect.  Logistic regression was used for this analysis.  The overall model was not 
significant, χ2 (3, N = 114) = 2.85, p = .42.  This finding indicates that age and sex were 
not significant predictors of who exhibited the framing effect. 
 The final research question asked whether the relevance of the reasons listed on 
the debiasing questionnaire predicted whether participants exhibited the framing effect.  
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These analyses were conducted separately for younger and older adults.  The relevance of 
participants’ reasons was scored according to a scoring rubric developed for the purpose 
of this study.  The rubric outlined all the possible advantages and disadvantages of each 
treatment, as presented in the scenarios and the participant instructions.  One point was 
given for each written answer that matched a possible answer on the scoring rubric.  For 
example, a response of, “I’ve seen my friends go through radiation treatment and it didn’t 
work for them” was scored a zero, whereas a response of, “Radiation treatment requires 
many trips to the hospital” was scored a one, since this information was presented in the 
participant instructions.  These points were then summed for each participant to produce 
a total score for the debiasing questionnaires. This scoring procedure is based on prior 
debiasing studies (e.g., Miller & Fagley, 1991; Sieck & Yates, 1997; Mashat, 2004) 
which found that participants must consider information relevant to the scenario in order 
to eliminate the framing effect. The scoring rubric used is presented in Appendix M.   
 Interrater reliability was computed for 20% of the data, which was selected at 
random.  The intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) was used as the measure of 
interrater reliability, due to the continuous variables produced by the scoring rubric. For 
the debiasing questionnaires, an ICC value of .982 was obtained.  Logistic regression 
analyses revealed that for both the younger, χ2 (1, N = 32) = .26, p = .61, and older adult 
groups, χ2 (1, N = 27) = 1.43, p = .23, the relevance of the reasons listed on the debiasing 






 Several post-hoc analyses were conducted to further examine potential predictors 
that contributed to exhibiting the framing effect.  The first exploratory analysis asked 
whether self-rated health status and variables related to the vicarious experience of cancer 
and decision making predicted whether participants succumbed to the framing effect.  
The questions about vicarious experience asked whether the participant had ever received 
or provided care to someone, whether they ever discussed the treatment of cancer with 
someone going through it, and whether someone close to them had ever been diagnosed 
with cancer.  Logistic regression was used for these analyses and they were conducted 
separately for the younger and older adult groups. The criterion variable was whether the 
participant exhibited the framing effect. 
 For the younger adult group, the overall model was not significant, χ2 (6, N = 61) 
= 6.69, p = .35, indicating that neither self-rated health status nor the vicarious experience 
variables predicted whether participants exhibited the framing effect.  There were 











Older Adult Health and Vicarious Experience Variables Predicting Framing Effect 
(n = 55) 
Variable B SE Odds Ratio Wald statistic 
Health 
    
   8.06 
  Poor -4.64 31.37 .01 .02 
  Fair 2.38 1.90 10.76 1.56 
  Average 4.51 2.03 91.11 4.96 
  Good 1.82 1.71 6.19 1.14 
Someone close diagnosed -2.41 1.15 .09 4.41* 
Care Receiver/Provider -2.20 .94 .11 5.47* 
Discussed Cancer -1.16 .91 .31 1.63 
* p < .05 
 Older adults who knew someone close to them who was diagnosed with cancer 
(O.R., .09, p < .05) were less likely to exhibit the framing effect than those who did not 
know someone diagnosed with cancer.  Additionally, those who had received or provided 
care at some point in their lives (O.R., .11, p < .05) were less likely to exhibit the framing 
effect than those who had never received or provided care. 
 The second exploratory analysis addressed the question of whether, for the control 
group, the number of relevant answers provided in the control questionnaires predicted 
the framing effect.  The control questionnaires focused on what the participant would be 
willing to do to improve health in certain areas.  Participants who were able to produce 
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more potential ways to improve their health were potentially more health conscious, and 
therefore might be less likely to exhibit the framing effect.   
 A scoring rubric was developed for the control questionnaires, similar to the one 
developed for the debiasing questionnaires.  Participants were given points for 
demonstrating willingness to change, enumerating what they would change, and 
acknowledging whether these changes would affect their day-to-day life.  These point 
values were then summed to determine a total score for each participant for the control 
questionnaires.  To determine interrater reliability, 20% of the data were dual-scored, 
which produced an intraclass correlation coefficient of .97.  Logistic regression analyses 
revealed that for both younger, χ2 (1, N = 32) = 1.65, p = .20, and older adults, χ2 (1, N = 
29) = 1.82, p = .18, the number of relevant reasons provided on the control questionnaires 
did not predict whether participants succumbed to the framing effect. The scoring rubric 
is presented in Appendix M. 
 The third exploratory question asked whether the number of reasons provided for 
the question, “What pieces of information were the most important in making your 
decision and why?” differed by group and/or age.  This was the last question on the 
debiasing questionnaire, and was also answered by the control group in the Rationale 
Request section.  The number of reasons provided by the participant was averaged across 
all three scenarios to produce one score for each participant.  Across age groups, those in 
the control group provided an average of 2.77 (SD = 1.81) reasons, whereas those in the 
debias group provided an average of 2.02 (SD = 1.41) reasons.  This difference was 
statistically significant, t(121) = 2.58, p = .01.  For the older adult group, there was no 
statistically significant difference between the number of reasons provided by the control 
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(M = 1.72, SD = 1.53) and debias (M = 1.13, SD = 1.36) groups.  For the younger adult 
group, the control group (M = 3.72, SD = 1.51) provided significantly more reasons than 
the debiasing group (M = 2.90, SD = .75; t(61) = 2.71, p < .01).  An examination of the 
differences between younger and older adults revealed that younger adults (M = 3.32, SD 
= 1.26) provided significantly more reasons than older adults (M = 1.36, SD = 1.40; 
t(119) = 8.12, p < .001).   
 The final exploratory analysis determined which of three factors were most 
important in predicting treatment choice: age (young vs. old), frame (survival vs. 
mortality), or group (control vs. debias).  Logistic regression analyses were used to 
examine the strength of these predictors for each of the three outcome information types.  
The criterion variable was whether the participant chose radiation or surgery.  The results 














Prediction of Treatment Choice for Cumulative and Interval Probability Formats  
Variable B SE Odds Ratio Wald Statistic 
Cumulative Probability (n = 118)     
   Age .27 .39 1.32 .51 
   Frame -1.11 .39 .33 8.37* 
   Group -.28 .39 .76 .52 
Interval Probability (n = 116)     
   Age -.22 .40 .80 .30 
   Frame -1.51 .41 .22 13.68** 
   Group .05 .40 1.05 .02 
*p < .01, ** p < .001 
 Results indicated that for the cumulative probability format, frame was the only 
significant predictor; those in the survival frame were less likely to choose radiation than 
surgery (O.R., .33, p < .01). There were similar results for the interval probability format.  
Frame was the only significant predictor, which indicated that those in the survival frame 
were less likely to choose radiation (O.R., .22, p < .001).  There were no significant 
results for the overall life expectancy format, which also did not show a framing effect in 
the first and second hypotheses.   
Discussion 
 Four hypotheses were tested in this study, and three were supported. The framing 
effect was demonstrated with younger and older adults, and the framing effect was 
precluded with younger adults using a debiasing procedure.  The framing effect was not 
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precluded with older adults.  Results will be discussed separately for each hypothesis, 
followed by a discussion of three additional research questions and the results of four 
exploratory analyses. 
Demonstration of the Framing Effect with Younger Adults 
 Hypothesis 1a proposed that the proportion of younger adults in the control group 
selecting surgery in the survival frame would differ significantly from the proportion 
selecting surgery in the mortality frame in at least one outcome information type, 
indicating an effect of frame.  The younger adult control group exhibited the framing 
effect in the cumulative and interval probability formats, but not the life expectancy 
format.  In the cumulative probability format, 68.8% of younger adults chose surgery in 
the survival frame, and the same percentage chose radiation in the mortality frame.  In the 
interval probability format, 81.2% chose surgery in the survival frame, and 56.3% chose 
radiation in the mortality frame.  This pattern of responses is similar to what has been 
shown in several studies on the framing effect in medical decision making using the same 
scenarios with younger adults (Tengs, 1987) and with younger adults, patients, and 
physicians (McNeil, Pauker, Sox, & Tversky, 1987): surgery is chosen more with the 
survival frame, and radiation is chosen more with the mortality frame.   
 The results regarding the outcome information types that resulted in the framing 
effect differed slightly from the findings of other studies.  For younger adult participants, 
Mashat (2004) found the framing effect only with the cumulative probability format, 
whereas McKee (2001) found a framing effect only with the life-expectancy outcome 
information format.  Tengs (1987) found a framing effect in the life expectancy and 
cumulative probability formats, and McNeil et al. (1982) found a framing effect in only 
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the life expectancy format, though this was across all participants in their study (students, 
patients, and physicians).  Thus, there is little consistency between studies on what 
outcome information types produce the framing effect.  McKee’s (2001) findings could 
be partially due to the within-subjects design employed in her study. There is some 
consistency in producing the framing effect in the cumulative probability outcome type 
for younger adults when a between-groups design is employed. 
Demonstration of the Framing Effect with Older Adults 
 Hypothesis 1b proposed that the proportion of older adults in the control group 
selecting surgery in the survival frame would differ significantly from the proportion 
selecting surgery in the mortality frame in at least one outcome information type, 
indicating an effect of frame. The framing effect was obtained with only the interval 
probability format.  In this format, 71.4% of older adults chose surgery in the survival 
frame, and the same percentage chose radiation in the mortality frame.  Obtaining the 
framing effect only in the interval probability format is inconsistent with the findings of 
McKee (2001), who found a framing effect in only the life expectancy format for older 
adults.  However, as mentioned above, this could be due to the design difference between 
her study and the current study, in that her study was a within-subjects design.  The 
participants in McKee’s (2001) study were making decisions for identical problems, 
which could have contributed to the “transparency” of the decision problem (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1986). Thus, participants may have noticed that they were being presented 
with discrepant information in each frame.  Participants had an opportunity to compare 
scenarios in the within-subjects design, which participants could not do in the between-
subjects design.  In McKee’s (2001) study, the life expectancy condition could have 
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produced a framing effect because comparison of the two scenarios would not reveal 
discrepant information, since the years of life expectancy for each treatment were the 
same in the survival and mortality conditions (e.g., 6.8 years for surgery, regardless of 
frame).  However, in the other two outcome formats, the presented information was 
different depending on the frame of the problem.   
 Yates and Patalano (1999) offer a potential explanation for the presence of the 
framing effect in the interval probability format for older adults. They suggest that when 
presented with a cognitively demanding task, older adults are probably more likely to 
apply a rule-based decision-making approach that is faster and less cognitively 
demanding. Therefore, older adults may be more vulnerable to biases resulting from the 
use of rules or heuristics.  
This account was supported by informal observations accumulated during testing 
sessions.  Older adults often commented that the interval probability format was the most 
difficult to understand, which may have contributed to a higher reliance on heuristics and 
rule-based decision-making.  Many participants read the interval probability scenario 
multiple times before making their treatment choice, which suggests that older adults 
may not have been able to retain the information in this outcome information type after 
one read through, or did not understand the information.  In contrast, when the data were 
presented in terms of life expectancy, participants often stated that years of life post 
treatment was most important to them, suggesting that the decision appeared to be based 
solely on the life expectancy information.  The life expectancy information was directly 
provided to the participant and therefore did not require any abstraction about the best 
choice based on the scenario.   
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 The lack of a framing effect with the cumulative probability format is difficult to 
explain.  Since this format was presented first, the participants may have more carefully 
considered the details of the scenario, which could have had a debiasing effect. This level 
of consideration may have decreased with the increased cognitive complexity required 
for the interval probability outcome information, which was presented second. 
Debiasing Younger Adults  
 Hypothesis 2a proposed that the proportion of younger adult participants in the 
debiasing group selecting surgery in the survival frame would not differ from the 
proportion selecting surgery in the mortality frame, indicating a successful avoidance of 
the framing effect. A framing effect was not present in the three outcome information 
types (cumulative probability, interval probability, and life expectancy).  These results 
are consistent with those of Mashat (2004), who also demonstrated the debiasing in the 
cumulative probability format. However, Mashat failed to obtain a framing effect with 
the interval probability and life expectancy formats, which precluded a test of the 
debiasing with these formats. It is important to note that in the present study the debiasing 
procedure was not successful for everyone.  If the debiasing procedure worked for 
everyone, there would have been an equal number of participants choosing each 
treatment within the survival and mortality frames.  However, several participants chose 
surgery over radiation in the survival frame, or chose radiation over surgery in the 
mortality format.  An examination of the data revealed that 14 younger adults showed the 
framing effect in the debiasing condition, indicating that the debiasing procedure did not 
work for these individuals.  Nevertheless, the debiasing procedure appears to offer a 
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potent remedy that can enable many, though not all, younger adults to avoid the 
consequences of biased decisions that are based in part on the framing of information.    
Debiasing Older Adults 
 Hypothesis 2b proposed that the proportion of older adult participants in the 
debiasing group selecting surgery in the survival frame would not differ from the 
proportion selecting surgery in the mortality frame, indicating a successful avoidance of 
the framing effect.  The framing effect was obtained in the debias group with the 
cumulative and interval probability formats, but not with the overall life expectancy 
format.  This result was unexpected.  The older adults in the control group did not show a 
framing effect in the cumulative probability format, which is consistent with the results of 
McKee (2001), but participants in the debias group did show the framing effect.  That is, 
when asked to consider the advantages and disadvantages of each treatment in the 
cumulative probability outcome type, older adults showed a framing effect, whereas the 
group that was asked to consider general information on stress did not show the effect. 
 The finding of a framing effect in the debiasing condition is difficult to explain 
since no framing effect was obtained without the debiasing instructions. These findings 
could be due to ineffective independent variable manipulation.  For example, older adults 
potentially did not do what the instructions asked them to do.  Another possibility is that 
the discrepant results are due to the design of the study, which produced two distinct 
control and debias groups.  From a practical standpoint, these debiasing findings are not 
distressing, as there was no framing effect to preclude with the older adults in the control 
condition with the cumulative probability outcome information.  
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 The absence of a significant debiasing effect with the interval probability format 
is also puzzling.  Careful consideration of information specific to the scenario appears to 
be the “active ingredient” in the debiasing procedure (Milley & Fagley, 1991; Mashat, 
2004). Informal observation of the older adult participants suggested that they were 
consistently not considering information presented in the scenarios.  Instead, older adults 
often cited less relevant information gained from relatives or friends (e.g., “Radiation was 
very painful for my neighbor.”)  If the cognitive demand of this outcome type was too 
high for the older adults’ ability level, they may not have had the capacity to override the 
heuristic approach to decision-making and therefore may have relied more heavily on this 
approach, as evident in their reliance on less relevant personal information (cf., McElroy 
& Seta, 2002). Older adults may also be relying on the availability heuristic when 
considering personally relevant information in their decision process.  The information 
about their friends and relatives receiving cancer treatment may have been easier to recall 
from long-term memory, thereby influencing them to rely on this easily accessible 
information, instead of considering the information presented in the scenario (e.g., Hastie 
& Dawes, 2001). The issue of older adults relying on more personally relevant 
information is discussed in the third exploratory analysis.  
 There are a few conclusions that can be drawn from the results of the main study 
hypotheses.  First, younger adults appear susceptible to the framing effect within more 
framing conditions than older adults. The difference between younger and older adults 
across framing conditions is formally explored in a later section. This finding is 
inconsistent with what some authors (e.g., Park 1999) suggest should be the case. That is, 
older adults should be more likely to engage in an automatic processing approach, due to 
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their experience with medical decisions and their decreased likelihood of engaging in 
controlled processing of decision-relevant information.  Yates and Patalano (1999) have 
argued that older adults will use automatic processing whenever it can be applied to a 
scenario, which would decrease the likelihood that they would carefully consider all 
aspects of each problem, and increase the likelihood that they would succumb to the 
framing effect.  It is also possible that different age groups employ different strategies for 
decision-making.  Older adults may rely on more personally relevant information, but 
may not be relying on this personal information to the exclusion of other, more factually 
based, information. 
 In the current study, the framing effect manifested quite differently in older than 
younger adults. It was only present in what was arguably the most confusing format 
(interval probability format) with older adults, and the framing effect was still present in 
the control group with the interval probability format.  This result presents a problem for 
those wishing to debias older adults with regard to the framing effect, specifically when 
information is presented in interval probability format. Participants in the present study 
worked through the decision materials on their own. Thus, there was no guarantee that 
the participants fully complied with the instructions. The debiasing procedure may have 
been more effective if each older adult participant was "walked through" the scenarios 
individually.  A think-aloud procedure may have increased the likelihood that older 
adults complied with the instructions.   
To summarize, three of the four main hypotheses were supported.  The existing 
literature supports the presence of the framing effect with certain outcome information 
types, but the research is quite varied in terms of which outcome information types 
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consistently produce the framing effect for younger and older adults.  Why the present 
pattern of results was obtained is unclear from the available data. However, informal 
observation and speculation by other authors (e.g., Park, 1999; Yates & Patalano, 1999; 
McElroy & Seta, 2002) sheds some light on the reasons for the obtained results.  
Susceptibility to the Framing Effect 
 The first research question asked whether older or younger adults were more 
susceptible to the framing effect.  Though no significant differences were found, a larger 
(statistically non-significant) percentage of younger adults succumbed to the framing 
effect. This result was surprising, since one might have expected the older adults to rely 
on more heuristic based reasoning to make their decision (see Park, 1999; Yates & 
Patalano, 1999) when faced with substantial demands on working memory and cognitive 
capacity. Thus, they would have been expected to rely more on personal experiences and 
anecdotal evidence, rather than carefully considering the alternatives. If that were the 
case, one would have expected greater susceptibility to framing; that is, biased decision 
making.   
 As with the first research question, the second research question was an attempt to 
determine whether characteristics of the individual participants could explain some of the 
variance in predicting susceptibility to framing. The finding that neither age nor sex 
contributed to the prediction of framing was consistent with the findings regarding the 
first research question.  Exploration of other individual difference variables (e.g., 
personality) may prove more fruitful, as there is evidence that impulsivity, anxiety, health 
involvement, and health negative affect correlate with attitudes that participants have 
towards risk-taking in a risky choice task (Lauriola, Russo, Lucidi, Violani, & Levin, 
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2005).  However, these individual difference variables have yet to be demonstrated as 
predictors with the medical problems explored in the current study. 
 The third research question, which examined whether the relevance of reasons 
listed on the debiasing questionnaire could predict the framing effect, yielded non-
significant findings. This question was based, in part, on work by Meyer et al. (1995), 
who found that older women offered less complete rationales for their decisions 
regarding treatment for breast cancer than younger women. The assumption in the present 
study was that if the older adults did not carefully consider the alternatives, they would   
offer fewer relevant reasons for their choices. Explanation of the results is difficult. The 
older adults may have carefully considered their choices, much as the younger adults, but 
may have had more trouble articulating why they made their selection.  This could be due 
to older adults’ heuristic based approach to the decision, whereas younger adults may be 
more able to articulate their reasons due to the use of a more analytic approach (e.g., 
McElroy & Seta, 2002).  However, this does not necessarily indicate that the older adults 
had no valid reasons for making their choices (Moye, Gurrera, Karel, Edelstein, & 
O’Connell, 2006). A second possibility is that the coding scheme, which was developed 
for the present study, was inadequate for capturing differences in amount of information 
processing that occurred.  For example, the current coding scheme was developed under 
the assumption that number of words written mattered less than the relevance of the 
reasons to the treatment choices.  Therefore, a coding scheme that examined how 
completely participants were considering the alternatives (including relevant and 
seemingly irrelevant material) might have better captured the differences in information 
processing. 
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 The aim of the exploratory analyses was to examine whether individual difference 
variables predicted the framing effect.  The present results suggest that prior personally 
acquired knowledge pertaining to cancer may inoculate one against the framing effect.  
However, it appears that this information needs to be relevant to the medical decision in 
order to have an inoculating effect. Older adult participants who had received or provided 
care at some point in their lives, and those who knew someone close to them who had 
been diagnosed with cancer, were less likely to exhibit the framing effect.  This finding 
points to the importance of relevant information in the decision process.  McElroy and 
Seta (2002) noted that in the area of medical decision-making, the less relevant the 
decision is to the participant, the more likely the framing effect will be exhibited.  
Therefore, this decision vignette may have been more relevant to those individuals who 
had been involved in these types of decisions in the past, thus inoculating them to the 
framing effect.  In addition to the relevance of the decision vignette, individuals with 
relevant personal experiences may be considering more pieces of information before 
making their treatment choice.  For example, Pierce (1996) found that individuals 
remembered the treatment choices that have been made by friends and family, and used 
that information to inform their own treatment choices.  Additionally, Meyer et al. (1995) 
found that prior knowledge about a condition (breast cancer) influenced what treatment 
choice was selected.  Therefore, in the present study, those older adult participants who 
knew someone close to them who had been diagnosed with cancer may have considered 
more information before making their decision, because they had been involved in 
similar decisions in the past.  Likewise, participants who had received or provided care 
may have participated in medical decision making as a function of being a care provider. 
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In addition, these individuals may have developed a network of individuals who had 
made a variety of medical decisions for themselves and their care recipients.  Thus, there 
is a variety of research that supports the finding that those who have faced similar 
decisions in the past, therefore increasing the relevance of the current decision, may be 
less susceptible to the framing effect. 
In examining predictors of the framing effect, we hypothesized that health 
conscious behavior may lead an individual to be less susceptible the effect of frame.  
Many of the questions on the control questionnaire tapped into health behaviors.  For 
instance, participants were asked what they would be willing to do if their doctor told 
them they were suffering from stress, gum disease, or low levels of physical fitness.  
Therefore, we hypothesized that responses to these questions represented an individual’s 
health conscious behaviors.  Individuals with higher levels of health conscious behaviors 
were apparently no more likely to succumb to the framing effect than those with lower 
levels, as responses indicating willingness to change unhealthy behaviors on the control 
questionnaires failed to predict the framing effect.   
Consideration of Important Information in the Decision Process 
Across age groups, the control group provided more relevant reasons than the 
debias group when asked to answer the question, “What information is most important to 
you in making your decision?”  This is counterintuitive to what would be expected.  One 
might expect that since the debias group was specifically asked to consider the 
advantages and disadvantages of the treatments, they would provide more relevant 
reasons as to what influenced their final decision.  It could be that the number of reasons 
is not important, but rather that individuals with only one reason had an important reason 
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for considering only one piece of information.  Additionally, the double presentation of 
the scenarios to the control group could account for the greater number of relevant 
reasons provided by the control group, as compared to the debias group.  The control 
group was presented with the scenarios initially, and was then presented with them again 
for the Rationale Request section.  Therefore they might have provided fewer reasons 
after the first presentation, if asked record their responses at that point.  
The more interesting finding is the age differences in number of relevant reasons 
provided.  The responses that older adults provided to this question were not as relevant 
to the information provided in the scenarios, and were based more on personal 
experiences.  This finding is consistent with the results of Meyer et al. (1995) who found 
that older women offered less complete rationales for their treatment choice than younger 
women.  However, it still has yet to be demonstrated that offering less complete 
rationales for decisions is related to lower quality decisions.    
Prediction of Treatment Choice 
The final exploratory analysis aimed to determine which variable was the best 
predictor of treatment choice: age (young vs. old), frame (survival vs. mortality), or 
group (control vs. debias).  Previous studies (e.g., McNeil, Pauker, Sox. & Tversky, 
1982; Tengs, 1987; McKee, 2001) concluded that participants were more likely to choose 
surgery in the survival frame and radiation in the mortality frame.  However, these 
studies collapsed across age groups in their sample, and therefore did not examine 
whether other variables, including age, were better predictors of treatment choice.  The 
present results revealed that frame was the only significant predictor, out of frame, age, 
and group, for the cumulative and interval probability formats, with participants choosing 
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surgery more often than radiation in the survival frame. This finding is consistent with 
the above studies, but McKee (2001) and McNeil et al (1982) did not rule out whether 
age was primarily responsible for the treatment decision.    
Limitations 
 The results of the current study must be considered in light of some limitations.    
First, the present study considered treatments for only one medical condition (lung 
cancer).  Although many participants drew on information from friends and family 
regarding treatments for other types of cancer, these results cannot be generalized to other 
types of cancer or to other acute and/or chronic medical conditions.  Additionally, only 
two treatment choices were presented.  Some older adult participants refused to pick one 
treatment, stating that they would probably have to end up getting both, or that they 
would choose neither.  Therefore, the presentation of only two treatment options is a 
limitation, considering that many other treatment options, or combination of treatment 
options, are available to patients with lung cancer. Additionally, some participants may 
have had difficulty choosing between these two treatment options because they were 
unable to envision themselves ever facing these decisions.  This could have been a barrier 
to producing accurate treatment decisions (as might be faced in real life) among the 
participants.   Second, this study involved hypothetical scenarios.  Although some of the 
older adult participants disclosed that they had gone through treatment for lung cancer, 
for many individuals the treatment decisions requested in this study were not decisions 
ever faced in their personal lives.  This raises the possibility that individuals may make 
different decisions in the laboratory as compared to when they are faced with real life 
medical decisions, which are more relevant to their current situation. A related potential 
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problem that can occur is the failure, or inability of older adults to place themselves in 
hypothetical situations.  Third, the design of the study was cross-sectional, which only 
allows one to observe results exhibited by the two age groups, but does not allow one to 
conclude that age alone affects one’s capacity to exhibit or avoid (through debiasing) the 
framing effect.  Additionally, this type of design does not allow one to rule out cohort 
differences as part of the reason for differences among age groups.  Finally, the sample 
was primarily Caucasian, and the older adult participants were primarily women.  This 
sample reflects the population of rural Appalachia, but is not representative of all younger 
and older adults who face medical decisions. Therefore the findings may not be 
generalizable to other ethinicities, or even to a primarily older adult male sample. 
Conclusions 
 The results of this study are further evidence that frame does play a role in 
treatment choice.  The findings indicate that frame (survival vs. mortality), outcome 
information type (interval probabilities, cumulative probabilities, and overall life 
expectancy), and vicarious experience variables influence medical decision-making.  
Interestingly, the results on all the personal medical decision-making framing studies to 
date are opposite of what would be expected based on Prospect Theory (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979).  According to Prospect Theory, participants are expected to be risk 
averse when deciding between gains, and risk seeking when deciding between losses.  
Previous studies have identified surgery as the more risky treatment in the current 
medical scenarios (McNeil et al., 1982).  Therefore, in medical scenarios, participants are 
consistently risk seeking when deciding between gains (choosing surgery in the survival 
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frame), and risk averse when deciding between losses (choosing radiation in the mortality 
frame).   
 In the current study, older adults were less likely to succumb to the framing effect 
than younger adults, but the framing effect was not avoided by asking participants to 
consider the advantages and disadvantages of each treatment.  There is inconclusive 
evidence in the current study and in the literature on the framing effect as to which 
outcome information types should consistently produce the framing effect.  Comparison 
of results among studies is difficult, due to different study designs (between vs. within-
subjects), slight adaptations to the standard scenarios used in previous studies, and 
differences in administration of study materials.  Although the current study did not 
produce a framing effect in the overall life expectancy format, other studies have found 
an effect with this outcome information type, which precludes us from drawing any 
conclusions as to the best way to present medical information.  Further research which 
uses similar scenarios and a similar design is needed to produce clearer results regarding 
the conditions under which a framing effect is produced, and avoided, reliably.   
 The finding that experience with care and the discussion of cancer significantly 
reduces the likelihood that an older adult will exhibit the framing effect moves us one 
step closer to identifying individuals who are most susceptible to the framing effect, and 
offers a "natural" debiasing alternative. Additionally, for younger adults, the elimination 
of the framing effect may be as simple as asking them to consider the advantages and 
disadvantages of the treatments before making their treatment choice.  Although it is 
alarming that a major medical decision can be influenced by something as simple as a 
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change in the wording, it is equally important to note that there are simple and 
straightforward ways of eliminating this effect for certain populations.   
Future Directions 
 Several future areas of research are suggested from the results of this study.  First, 
the results of this study need to be replicated.  The findings regarding which conditions 
produced a framing effect in younger and older adults were somewhat inconsistent with 
previous studies.  Future studies need to ensure that the same scenarios are used and that 
the design of the study is similar, which will allow for easier comparison of results.  
Second, one might consider incorporating a friend or significant other into the decision-
making process.  In terms of ecological validity, a study that acknowledges the fact that 
many individuals discuss these types of decisions with friends or family members may 
produce different results (cf. Strough, Patrick, Swenson, Cheng, & Barnes, 2003).  
Collaborative decision making could preclude a framing effect, due to the discussion that 
would be generated regarding both the advantages and disadvantages of the treatments 
and the incorporation of personal information.  Additionally, the two age groups studied 
in the current study are very distinct.  An examination into the framing effect among 
middle-aged and young-old adults is warranted, as these age groups might exhibit 
different patterns of choices than the participants in the present study. A longitudinal 
study would be preferable because it avoids any potential cohort effects and permits the 
researcher to pinpoint who is most susceptible to the framing effect, by examining 
susceptibility at various points throughout the lifespan.  Although informal observations 
and results from the exploratory analyses from this study lends itself to the conclusion 
that older adults relied more on personally relevant information when making this 
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specific medical decision, we still do not know exactly how older adults go about making 
medical decisions.  An examination into this process is warranted.  Finally, the use of 
situations in which older adults are facing medical decisions would strengthen the results 
of all of the framing effect studies to date, as this would eliminate the problem of the 
medical decisions not being relevant to the participants.  This effect has been addressed 
through the use of hypothetical, laboratory based experiments, but has yet to be 
demonstrated in a real decision-making process. 
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Demographic Questionnaire  
 
Age: __________   Sex: (circle one)   Male          Female 
 
Years of Education: ____________ 
 
Marital Status: (circle one) 
 Single  Married Separated Divorced Widowed 
 
Ethnicity: (race) 
 Caucasian (White) 
 African American (Black) 
 Asian American 
 Hispanic 
 Pacific Islander 
 Native American (American Indian/Alaskan Native) 
 
Have you ever been diagnosed with a chronic illness (e.g., heart disease, diabetes, 
arthritis)?   Yes_____ No_____ 
  
How long has it been since you were examined by a doctor? ________________ 
 
Please rate your current health status:   1. Poor 
        2. Fair 
        3. Average 
        4. Good 
        5. Excellent 
Do you smoke?  Yes ______  No ______ 
  
 If yes, how many years have you smoked?_______ 
 
What is your current occupation or the occupation you pursued for the majority of your 
adult life? ______________________________ 
 
Has someone close to you ever been diagnosed with any type of cancer?   
Yes ____  No ____ 
 
 If yes, what type of cancer? ___________ 
  
 Please indicate your relationship to this person: ___________   







Have you ever received or provided care for someone?  Yes ______  No ______ 
  
 If yes, were you the care receiver or provider?  (circle one)  
  Receiver         Provider  
  
 How long were you the care receiver or provider?  _______ 
 
Have you ever discussed the experience and/or treatment of cancer with someone who 
had cancer?  Yes _____   No _____ 
  
 If so, please rate how involved you were in this person’s life during their  
 experience with cancer: 
 
            1---------2------------3------------4-----------5 


































 The following pages contain specific information about cancer treatments at 
several Chicago area hospitals.  Each hospital has its own doctors and policies regarding 
patient care, approaches to treatment, and different survival rates for the various types of 
treatment.  For each hospital, please indicate whether you prefer surgery or radiation 
therapy.  Below are general descriptions of the treatments. 
 Surgery for lung cancer involves an operation on the lungs.  Most patients are in 
the hospital for two to three weeks and have some pain around their incisions; they spend 
a month or so recuperating at home.  After that they generally feel fine. 
 Radiation therapy for lung cancer involves the use of radiation to kill the tumor 
and requires coming to the hospital about four times a week for six weeks.  Each 
treatment takes a few minutes, and during the treatment patients lie on a table as if they 
were having an x-ray.  During the course of treatment, some patients develop nausea and 
vomiting, but by the end of six weeks they generally feel fine. 
 Thus, after the initial six weeks, patients treated with either surgery or radiation 
therapy feel about the same. 
 Please answer the following questions in the order that they appear.  Do not read 








Survival Worded Hospital Vignettes 
(Cumulative Probability Information) 
Hospital 1
Of 100 patients having radiation therapy, all patients live through the treatment, 77 
patients live for more than one year, and 22 patients live for more than five years. 
Of 100 patients having surgery, 90 patients live through treatment, 68 patients live for 

















(Interval Probability Information) 
Hospital 2
Of 100 patients having surgery, 90 patients live until the end of treatment, 78 patients live 
through treatment but less than one year, 44 patients live for one to five years, and 10 
patients live longer than five years. 
Of 100 patients having radiation therapy, all patients live through the end of treatment, 77 
live through the treatment but less than one year, 22 patients live for one to five years, 

















(Life Expectancy Information) 
Hospital 3
Of 100 patients having surgery, 90 percent of the patients live through treatment.  The 
patients who survive surgery have an average life expectancy of 6.8 years. 
Of 100 patients having radiation therapy, all patients live through treatment.  The patients 




















Mortality Worded Hospital Vignettes 
(Cumulative Probability Information) 
Hospital 1
Of 100 patients having surgery, 10 die during the treatment, 32 die by one year, and 66 
die by 5 years. 
Of 100 patients having radiation therapy, no patients die during treatment, 23 die by one 

















(Interval Probability Information) 
Hospital 2
Of 100 patients having radiation therapy, no patients die by the end of treatment, 32 die 
in the time interval between treatment and one year, 55 die in the interval between one 
and five years, and 22 die sometime after five years. 
Of 100 patients having surgery, 10 patients die by the end of treatment, 22 patients die in 
the interval between treatment and one year, 34 patients die in the interval between one 

















(Life Expectancy Information) 
Hospital 3
Of 100 patients having radiation therapy, no patients die during treatment.  The patients 
who survive treatment have an average life expectancy of 4.7 years. 
Of 100 patients having surgery, 10 percent of the patients die during treatment.  The 





















Please answer the following questions before choosing your treatment for Hospital 1: 
Hospital 1:  What are the advantages of surgery? 
 
 
  What are the disadvantages of surgery? 
 
 
  What are the advantages of radiation? 
 
 
  What are the disadvantages of radiation? 
 
 
What pieces of information are the most important in making your 










Please answer the following questions before choosing your treatment for Hospital 1: 
Stress is a common psychological state that also has negative effects on the body.  
Stress has its harmful effects by altering the levels of certain hormones in the body, 
resulting in a considerable array of disorders, such as increased blood pressure, 
heart disease, obesity, diabetes, asthma, and even brain cell death. 
 
Imagine that your doctor tells you that your body is suffering from the effects of too much 
stress and asks you to answer the following questions: 







2. How willing would you be to do daily exercises proven to reduce stress (e.g., 



















Please answer the following questions before choosing your treatment for Hospital 2: 
For many people, dental hygiene is a serious problem.  Gum disease, one of the most 
common disorders of the mouth, is an inflammation of the gums that is caused by 
bacteria in a plaque, a sticky, colorless film that constantly forms on teeth.  If not 
removed through daily brushing and flossing, plaque can build up and the bacteria 
may infect not only your gums and teeth, but also the gum tissue and bone that 
support the teeth.  This can cause the teeth to become loose, fall out, or have to be 
removed by a dentist. 
Imagine that you have been diagnosed with gum disease and asked to answer the 
following questions: 
1. What changes in your daily routine would you be willing to make to alleviate the 

















3. How severe would you rate the occurrence of this disease as compared to other 










Please answer the following questions before choosing your treatment for Hospital 3: 
Physical fitness is at the heart of prevention of many physical disorders.  Physical 
fitness has been shown to improve not only physical functioning but also mental 
wellness.  Unfortunately, most Americans are not at the level of fitness 
recommended by health professionals.  The increasing number of overweight and 
obsess people in this country has led to increased rates of heart disease, stroke, 
diabetes, and other ailments. 
Imagine that you have been advised by your doctor to increase your physical fitness and 
asked to answer the following questions: 
 





































Treatment Choice Questionnaire 
 
Which cancer treatment would you prefer?  Circle one: 
 











































Answer Sheet (Survival Scenarios) 
 
Hospital 1
Of 100 patients having radiation therapy, all patients live through the treatment, 77 
patients live for more than one year, and 22 patients live for more than five years. 
Of 100 patients having surgery, 90 patients live through treatment, 68 patients live for 
more than one year, and 34 patients live for more than five years. 
 


















Of 100 patients having surgery, 90 patients live until the end of treatment, 78 patients live 
through treatment but less than one year, 44 patients live for one to five years, and 10 
patients live longer than five years. 
Of 100 patients having radiation therapy, all patients live through the end of treatment, 77 
live through the treatment but less than one year, 22 patients live for one to five years, 
and 5 patients live for more than five years. 
 

















Of 100 patients having surgery, 90 percent of the patients live through treatment.  The 
patients who survive surgery have an average life expectancy of 6.8 years. 
Of 100 patients having radiation therapy, all patients live through treatment.  The patients 
who survive radiation therapy have an average life expectancy of 4.7 years. 
 

































Answer Sheet (Mortality Scenarios) 
 
Hospital 1
Of 100 patients having surgery, 10 die during the treatment, 32 die by one year, and 66 
die by 5 years. 
Of 100 patients having radiation therapy, no patients die during treatment, 23 die by one 
years, and 78 die by 5 years. 
 


















Of 100 patients having radiation therapy, no patients die by the end of treatment, 32 die 
in the time interval between treatment and one year, 55 die in the interval between one 
and five years, and 22 die sometime after five years. 
Of 100 patients having surgery, 10 patients die by the end of treatment, 22 patients die in 
the interval between treatment and one year, 34 patients die in the interval between one 
and five years, and 34 patients die sometime after five years. 
 

















Of 100 patients having radiation therapy, no patients die during treatment.  The patients 
who survive treatment have an average life expectancy of 4.7 years. 
Of 100 patients having surgery, 10 percent of the patients die during treatment.  The 
patients who survive surgery have an average life expectancy of 6.8 years. 
 
































Rationale Request  
 
1) For the Hospital 1 scenario, what pieces of information were the most important in 




















2) For the Hospital 2 scenario, what pieces of information were the most important in 






















3) For the Hospital 3 scenario, what pieces of information were the most important in 
















































IRB Cover Letter 
To the participant: 
 
The following questionnaires are part of a study entitled “Medical decision-making” that 
is being conducted as part of a Master’s thesis, in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the Master’s of Science degree in West Virginia University’s Department of 
Psychology. 
 
The study is being conducted to investigate possible factors involved in medical decision-
making. 
 
All your responses on this survey will be completed in an anonymous manner and will be 
kept strictly confidential. 
 
You may choose not to respond to any question on the survey which you are not 
comfortable answering, although your cooperation is helpful. 
 
Your participation in this study is strictly voluntary and you may withdraw from the 
experiment at any time. 
 
Should you decide to withdraw from the study or refuse to answer any or all questions on 

































I, __________________________, have been asked to participate in this research study, 
which has been explained to me by Erin Woodhead.  This research is being conducted by 
Erin Woodhead, and Barry Edelstein, PhD, to fulfill the requirements for a Master’s 
thesis in the Department of Psychology at West Virginia University, under the 
supervision of Dr. Barry Edelstein, PhD. 
 
Purposes of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to learn more about how people make medical decisions.  
Approximately 60 younger adult participants and 60 older adult participants are expected 
to participate in this study. 
 
Description of Procedure 
This study involves the completion of a set of forms that asks the participant to read a 
medical scenario, complete a questionnaire, and then make a selection between medical 
treatments.  We will also be asking some participants additional questions about the 
medical treatment they have chosen.  All participants will be asked to complete a brief 
demographic questionnaire.  It will take approximately 35 minutes to complete all the 
forms in this study. 
 
I have been asked to read a medical scenario, complete a questionnaire, and make a 
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questions about my treatment selection, if requested, and to complete a demographic 
questionnaire.  The medical treatment selection will ask me questions about three 
hypothetical medical scenarios and will take approximately 20 minutes to complete.  The 
decision rationale will only be asked of some participants.  This form will ask me to 
provide a rationale for the decisions I have made in the hypothetical medical scenarios.  
This will take approximately 10 minutes to complete.  The demographic questionnaire 
will ask me to state my personal characteristics and will take about 5 minutes to 
complete.  I have been told that I may see the above forms before signing this consent 
and that I do not have to answer all the questions if I decide to participate. 
 
Risks and Discomforts 
There are no known or expected risks from participating in this study 
 
Alternatives 
I understand that I do not have to participate in this study 
 
Benefits 
I understand that this study is not expected to be of direct benefit to me, but the 
knowledge gained may be of benefit to others.  If I am a younger adult participant, I will 
receive extra credit in my ___________ class for participation, but there are other ways I  
may earn extra credit.  If I am an older adult participant, my name will be recorded for an 
opportunity to win $100. 
 
Contact Persons 
For more information about this research, I can contact Erin Woodhead, at 304-376-3338, 
or her supervisor, Dr. Barry Edelstein at 304-293-2001.  For information regarding my 




I understand that any information about me obtained as a result of my participation in this 
research will be kept as confidential as legally possible.  My record will be kept in a 
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that my research records and test results, just like hospital records, may be subpoenaed by 
court order or may be inspected by the study sponsor, federal regulatory authorities 
(including the Food and Drug Administration), or the IRB without my additional consent.  
In any publications that results from this research, neither my name nor any information 
from which I might be identified will be published without my consent.   
 
Voluntary Participation 
Participation in this study is voluntary.  I understand that I am free to withdraw my 
consent to participate in this study at any time and that such refusal to participate will not 
affect my class standing, grades, or job status.  Refusal to participate or withdrawal will 
involve no penalty to me.  I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about the 
research, and I have received answers concerning areas I did not understand. 
 
 
Upon signing this form, I will receive a copy. 
 
I willingly consent to participate in this research. 
 
________________________________________             ________           _______ 
Signature of Subject              Date  Time 
 
 
_________________________________________           _________         _______ 
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Raw data from Contingency Tables used to create Tables 1 to 5 
 
Table 1: Younger Adult Control Group 
 
 Cumulative Probability 
(n = 32) 
 
Interval Probability 
(n = 32) 
 
Life Expectancy 
(n = 32) 
 
Frame Surgery     Radiation Surgery     Radiation Surgery     Radiation 
Survival  11             5 13              3 10              6 
Mortality 5             11 7              9 9              7 
 
Table 2: Older Adult Control Group 
 
 Cumulative Probability 
(n = 28) 
 
Interval Probability 
(n = 28) 
 
Life Expectancy 
(n = 29) 
 
Frame Surgery     Radiation Surgery     Radiation Surgery     Radiation 
Survival  8            7 10             4 11              4 
Mortality 7             6 4            10 7              7 
 
Table 3: Younger Adult Debias Group 
 
 Cumulative Probability 
(n = 31) 
 
Interval Probability 
(n = 31) 
 
Life Expectancy 
(n = 31) 
 
Frame Surgery     Radiation Surgery     Radiation Surgery     Radiation 
Survival  8               7 10              5 12             3 












Table 4: Older Adult Debias Group 
 
 Cumulative Probability 
(n = 29) 
 
Interval Probability 
(n = 27) 
Life Expectancy 
(n = 27) 
Frame Surgery     Radiation Surgery     Radiation Surgery     Radiation 
Survival  10              4 11              3 11              3 
Mortality 4              11 5               8 8               5 
 
Table 5: Exhibition of Framing Effect by Age (n = 117) 
 
 Did Show Framing Did Not Show Framing 
Younger Adults 28 34 


























Scoring Rubric for the Debiasing and Control Questionnaires 
 
Debiasing Questionnaire Scoring Rubric: 
 
Open-Ended Questions Scoring Template: 
1 point for each correct answer (may get more than 1 point for each question). No points 
for answers that don’t directly reference material provided in the hospital scenario. 
 
Analyses: 1) more points on debias questionnaire = less likely to succumb to framing 
effect? 2) Those filling out the debiasing questionnaire have more reasons for Question 5 
than do those filling out the same questions for the control rationale request. 
 
Survival Debias Hospital 1: 
 
Question 1: 
1 point answers: more patients live past 5 years, longer survival rate 
 
Question 2: 
1 point answers: only 90 live through surgery, less people live for more than 1 year than 




1 point answers: no patients die during radiation, more live for more than one year 
compared to surgery 
 
Question 4: 
1 point answers: less people live past 5 years, lots of trips to hospital, nausea/vomiting 
 
Question 5: 
1 point for each statement that directly addresses something in the Hospital 1 scenario 
1 point if they make a general statement about life expectancy influencing their decision 
 
Survival Debias Hospital 2: 
 
Question 1: 
1 point answers: more patients live past 5 years, longer survival rate, more patients live in 
interval between 1 and 5 years, more live through treatment but less than one year. 
 
Question 2: 
1 point answers: only 90 out of 100 live through surgery, less people live for more than 1 






1 point answers: all patients live through radiation 
 
Question 4: 
1 point answers: less live through treatment but less than one year, less live from one to 
five years, less live more than 5 years, lots of trips to hospital, nausea/vomiting 
 
Question 5: 
1 point for each statement that directly addresses something in the Hospital 2 scenario 
1 point if they make a general statement about life expectancy influencing their decision 
 
Survival Debias Hospital 3: 
 
Question 1: 




1 point answers: only 90 out of 100 live through surgery, in hospital for 2-3 weeks, pain 
around incisions, 1 month recuperation time 
 
Question 3: 
1 point answers: all patients live through radiation 
 
Question 4: 




1 point for each statement that directly addresses something in the Hospital 3 scenario 
1 point if they make a general statement about life expectancy influencing their decision 
 
Mortality Debias Hospital 1: 
 
Question 1: 
1 point answers: less die by 5 years 
 
Question 2: 
1 point answers: more die by one year, 10 die during treatment, in hospital for 2-3 weeks, 
pain around incisions, 1 month recuperation time 
 
Question 3: 
1 point answers: no patients die during radiation, less die by one year than surgery figures 
 
Question 4: 
1 point answers: more people die by 5 years, lots of trips to hospital, nausea/vomiting 
 95
Question 5: 
1 point for each statement that directly addresses something in the Hospital 1 scenario 
1 point if they make a general statement about life expectancy influencing their decision 
 
Mortality Debias Hospital 2: 
 
Question 1: 
1 point answers: less die in interval between treatment and one year, less die in interval 
between 1 and 5 years.      
 
Question 2: 
1 point answers: 10 die during surgery, more die sometime after 5 years, in hospital for 2-
3 weeks, pain around incisions, 1 month recuperation time 
 
Question 3: 
1 point answers: no die during radiation, less die sometime after 5 years 
 
Question 4: 
1 point answers: less live through treatment but less than one year, less live from one to 
five years, less live more than 5 years, lots of trips to hospital, nausea/vomiting 
 
Question 5: 
1 point for each statement that directly addresses something in the Hospital 2 scenario 
1 point if they make a general statement about life expectancy influencing their decision 
 
Mortality Debias Hospital 3: 
 
Question 1: 




1 point answers: 10 percent die during surgery, in hospital for 2-3 weeks, pain around 
incisions, 1 month recuperation time 
 
Question 3: 
1 point answers: no patients die during radiation 
 
Question 4: 




1 point for each statement that directly addresses something in the Hospital 3 scenario 




Rational Request Scoring 
 
1 point for each statement in each question that directly references something stated in 
the corresponding hospital scenario, or in the answers provided above for each hospital.  
Also, award 1 point for anything referenced in the participant instructions (front page). 
 
 
Control Questionnaire Scoring Rubric: 
Open-Ended Scoring for Control Questionnaires: 
 
Stress Questionnaire 
1. What changes? 
 1 point for each change they’d be willing to make 
 only 1 point if they wrote, “I’d do whatever the doctor recommended.” 
 
2. How willing? 
 0 points – not willing 
 1 points – indicate that they’re willing, but don’t provide a qualifier, or indicate 
 that they’re willing to exercise in general (repeating the question) 
 2 points – indicate willingness and provide a qualifier of how willing (e.g., very) 
 3 points - detail how willing with specific changes they would make (e.g., specific 
 ways they would exercise)  
 
3. How much would it affect your day to day routine? 
 0 points – wouldn’t affect it much 
 1 point – general statement that it would help out 
If they give specific ways, assign 1 point for each way they think it would help 
out.   
 
Gum Disease Questionnaire
1. What changes? 
 1 point for each change they’d be willing to make 
 only 1 point if they write that they would do what the doctor recommended 
 
2. What changes in diet? 
 1 point for each diet change that they list 
 
3. How severe would you rate gum disease, compared to other diseasest? 
 1 – not as severe 
 2 – same severity 







1. What changes in diet? 
 1 point for each diet change they’d be willing to make 
 only 1 point if they write that they would do what the doctor recommended 
 
2. What lifestyle changes? 
 1 point for each lifestyle change listed 
 same as above if they would defer to the doctor 
 
3. How would it affect your day-to-day life? 
 0 points – not at all affected 
 1 point – general statement that it would help out 
 If they give specific ways, assign 1 point for each way they think it would help 
 out. 
 
 
 
